Jan
30
2017
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Posted 7 years 296 days ago ago by Admin
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A 15 September 2016 article in The New York Times titled “‘Miracle on
the Hudson’ Safety Advice Not Carried Out,” had these sobering words:
In the seven years since an
airline pilot saved 155 lives by ditching his crippled airliner in the
Hudson River, there's been enough time to write a book and make a movie,
but apparently not enough to carry out most of the safety
recommendations stemming from the accident. Of the 35 recommendations
made by the National Transportation Safety Board in response to the
incident involving US Airways Flight 1549, only six have been heeded.”
The airline pilot referred to is,
of course, Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger, who recently sounded a
similar refrain on his Facebook page:
“I’m very disappointed so many of
the important safety recommendations made by the National
Transportation Safety Board after Flight 1549 have not yet been mandated
by the FAA. Unless the FAA mandates safety improvements, airlines
historically will not adopt them. We owe it to everyone who flies to act
on what is learned from accidents, often at great cost in lives lost,
instead of just filing it away to gather dust while we await the next
accident.”
You can hear the frustration in
his post lamenting the treatment the FAA has given the NTSB safety
recommendations. Whereas Sully managed to save the lives of 155 people,
our industry has documented well over 1,000 people involved in HEMS
accidents, with nearly 400 HEMS crew members losing their lives. That
staggering total would fill over six aircraft similar to the one Sully
landed in the Hudson.
Sully, welcome to our HEMS world.
The NTSB has carefully studied
the problems in our HEMS industry and recommended to the FAA some
excellent safety fixes, but similar to Sully’s case, the FAA has refused
to act. The reason? According to a 27 August 2012 post at the “Aviation
Law Monitor” website, the answer is: “When the FAA was created; it was
charged with both regulating aviation and promoting it. The FAA’s
inherent conflict of interest explains why the FAA so often ignores FAA
regulations.”
That’s why Sully’s statement
doesn’t surprise me. He’s now experienced the same inaction by the FAA
that we in the HEMS industry have been subject to for years.
After 2008 became the worst year
on record in the HEMS industry, the NTSB formed a Board of Inquiry that
conducted a public hearing over four days in February 2009. Over 1,000
pages of sworn testimony from over 40 industry experts were generated to
determine what should be done to stop the bloodshed. The NTSB then
proposed their safety recommendations to the FAA. Several glaring
omissions of those life-saving recommendations were evident when the new
FAA rules were announced five years—and 23 more deaths—later.
If you read the earlier safety
recommendation document written in 2009 by the then head of the FAA,
Randy Babbitt, (and signed off on by the then head of the NTSB, Deborah
Hersman, in September of that year) Babbitt wrote the following under
the heading “Dual Pilot/Autopilot Use”:
"A review of the NTSB Aviation
Accident Database revealed that during the 8-year period from 2000–2008,
123 HEMS accidents occurred, killing 104 people and seriously injuring
42 more. All but nine of these accidents involved operations with only
one pilot. Pilot actions or omissions, in some capacity, were attributed
as the probable cause in 60 of the 123 accidents. Most of these 60
accidents might have been prevented had a second pilot and/or an
autopilot been present."
The FAA chose to ignore the NTSB
recommendations because it would have put too great a financial burden
on the smaller operators, giving further ammunition to the argument that
our system in America needs a change if we ever expect to see a
reduction in HEMS accidents.
Robert Sumwalt, chairman of that
2009 Board of Inquiry, voiced his personal frustration with the FAA in a
January 2016 post on the “NTSB Safety Compass” blog:
“As evidenced by continued HEMS
crashes, more needs to be done. NTSB crash investigations have
demonstrated the safety benefits of scenario-based simulator or
simulator training, use of NVIS, and a second pilot or an autopilot.
After all, an industry that is designed to save lives should not be
claiming lives.”
In the FAA’s defense, the agency
is seriously shackled by its own mandate. Two friends of mine quit the
FAA in Washington, voicing their frustration at politics that hampered
creating meaningful rules to save lives. Good, well-meaning, hardworking
people working in the FAA know the problems we in HEMS face. They have
told me they would like to do more, but lack the power to do so because
of the nature of the lumbering beast they work under.
Here’s a good example of how the
agency hesitates to act. The FAA manager of general aviation attending
the EAA AirVenture Oshkosh air show in Wisconsin this past August was
interviewed on camera by a reporter from station KUSI. When asked when
he thought the FAA was going to do something to “fix” fuel systems that
aren’t crashworthy (reportedly in over 5,000 helicopters currently
flying) the general manager replied, “I was at a point where I would not
fly in a helicopter that didn’t have the (fuel system) upgrades.
Industry can stop producing aircraft that don’t have crashworthy fuel
tanks. Helicopter manufacturers need to shoulder much, if not all, of
the responsibility. We (the FAA) try not to hamper growth.”
By inference, the FAA won’t act
to fix a known problem, even one as deadly as faulty fuel systems that
have incinerated survivors in otherwise survivable crashes, because to
fix the problem would hamper growth in the industry. By their inaction,
the FAA is in effect putting a value on human life.
Sully’s recent experience with
FAA inaction, in parallel with our experiences in HEMS over the years,
is an indication that our system is in need of serious revamping. Anyone
on the street will tell you that air safety must be paramount, no
matter how it affects the bottom line. As Sully points out, your life
and my life depend on it.