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On February 2, 2005, a Bombardier Challenger 600-1A11 with registration N370V was to fly from Teterboro Airport (KTEB), New Jersey, to Chicago Midway International Airport (KMDW), Illinois, on a chartered flight. There were eight passengers onboard, two pilots, and a cabin aide. The flight was operated by Platinum Jet Management LLC of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in agreement with Darby Aviation of Muscle Shoals, Alabama.At 7:18 a.m. local time, the aircraft ran off the departure end of runway 6 at a ground speed of 110 knots, hitting an airport perimeter fence, crossing a six-lane highway, and striking a vehicle before moving through a parking lot and impacting a building. The pilots were seriously injured as well as two occupants of the vehicle. The cabin aide and eight passengers and one person in the building had minor injuries. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact and post-crash fire.What the NTSB foundThe probable cause of the accident was the pilots' failure to ensure that the aircraft was loaded within weight and balance limits and their attempt to take off with the center of gravity well forward of the forward takeoff limit, which prevented the aircraft from rotating at the intended speed.Contributing factors were Platinum Jet Management's (PJM) conduct of charter flights, using its own pilots and aircraft, without proper FAA certification. Darby Aviation failed to maintain operational control over 14 CFR Part 135 flights conducted under its certificate by PJM, resulting in patterns of flight crew performance deficiencies.Also contributing were the failure of the Birmingham Alabama FAA Flight Standards District Office to provide adequate surveillance and oversight of operations conducted under Darby Aviation's Part 135 certificate and the FAA's tacit approval of arrangements such as that between Darby and PJM.How the flight unfoldedThe aircraft was scheduled to arrive at Teterboro from McCarran International Airport (KLAS), Nevada, and depart at about 7 a.m. The two pilots and the cabin aide were assigned the flight the afternoon before and took a commercial flight from Fort Lauderdale to New York that evening, arriving at about 11:15 p.m. They stayed at a nearby hotel until picked up, arriving at the FBO about 5:20 a.m.The pilots performed their pre-flight duties, refueled the aircraft, started the engines and waited for the catering to arrive. They then taxied to another FBO to meet the passengers, who arrived between about 6:30 and 7:05 a.m. The captain loaded the aircraft; there was no baggage as such apart from that of the crew and there was only hand baggage in the cabin.The passengers told the captain that they were familiar with the aircraft as their company operated a Challenger. He briefed them on potential turbulence and started the engine checklist, believing the cabin aide would give a safety briefing to the passengers. Minutes later, the pilots began the before-takeoff checklist and nothing out of the ordinary was detected.At 7:17 a.m., the aircraft started the takeoff roll. The first officer called out 80 knots, V1 and rotation speed, but the aircraft failed to lift off the runway. About five seconds after passing rotation speed, the captain rejected the takeoff and applied the brakes, the speed brakes, and thrust reversers to try to stop the aircraft. It decelerated as it ran off the runway and impacted the building and started a fire.The pilots, who were initially trapped in the wreckage, wanted to exit the aircraft due to the fuel spillage, as they could see smoke and flames. The captain grabbed the first officer by the belt and pulled while the first officer pulled on an overhead bar, freeing his legs from the wreckage. The cabin aide could not open the main cabin door; a passenger opened it and then pushed and kicked it out so that they could evacuate. The first officer then crawled out of the door. Two passengers helped pull him away from the aircraft. The captain managed to free himself and crawled through the cabin, checking that there was no one left on the aircraft. He then exited the aircraft and walked away. He saw the passengers and the first officer and the fire crew but did not see the cabin aide (he was told that she was not onboard).The cabin aide's storyThe cabin aide's post-accident statement revealed a number of alarming events. She helped the passengers board and served some refreshments. One of the pilots closed the main cabin door prior to takeoff. She did not brief the passengers as she believed it was the pilot's job; she believed the captain had briefed them but did not hear what was said.The cabin aide said that she did a cabin walk-through to check that seatbelts were fastened and then took her jumpseat. She did not see any issue with the takeoff until she saw the perimeter fence; then she closed her eyes and tried to brace. When the aircraft stopped, she opened her eyes and saw that the pilots were alive but injured. They told her to get the passengers out of the airplane and run. It was dark and smoky in the cabin.She undid her seatbelt and went to the door but could not figure out how to open it. The passengers stepped in and managed to get it open. The cabin aide then climbed out of the aircraft, fell and got up again and ran away from the aircraft. She was then picked up by someone in a car and driven to a police officer and ambulance before going to the hospital.The missing safety briefingPJM's CEO said that it was company policy that one pilot would brief the passengers; however, the captain was unaware of this as he had not received the required Part 135 indoctrination training from Darby Aviation. The cabin aide believed that it was the pilot's responsibility to brief the passengers, so gave no briefing. Six of the eight passengers did not remember receiving a safety briefing. Two remembered the captain addressing them, and one of those called it a short briefing.The door the cabin aide could not openThe cabin aide believed that the pilots were responsible for opening the door unless it was an emergency and they could not. When evacuating the aircraft, she considered leaving by the overwing exit as she was trained to do previously; however, the main door was closer, and there was smoke in the cabin. She was not familiar with the arm and disarm lever on the main cabin door.Seatbelts and loose glasswareOnly four of the eight passengers were wearing seatbelts before takeoff. They said that they were not told to fasten their seatbelts. Two put their seatbelts on during the takeoff roll. Two passengers seated on the divan could not find their seatbelts; they fell on the floor during the rejected takeoff. The seatbelts were folded under the divan seatback cushions.The passengers were holding their refreshments served prior to takeoff, in glassware or chinaware, which were found in the cabin post-accident. One passenger was injured by his broken coffee cup. The cabin aide had not cleared them away.Conflicting accounts of the evacuationThe cabin aide said that she evacuated after the passengers when, in fact, one passenger said he fell onto her during the evacuation. Another passenger said he saw her standing outside the aircraft before he evacuated. Several passengers referred to her as a "flight attendant."Lack of trainingThe captain's records did not indicate that he had training in cabin evacuation, emergency equipment, or hands-on emergency drills. He had not received Part 135 training through Darby Aviation. The first officer had only partially completed his Part 135 training.The cabin aide had worked for PJM as a contract employee since October 2004 and was on a four-month probation. She had received some basic on-the-job training by the lead cabin aide. She said that she had operated the exits and knew where the safety equipment was. She was due to undertake training after her probation period.The cabin aide had never worked in aviation, as a flight attendant or as a cabin aide. She was a model and a waitress and continued those roles while being on call for PJM. She was never fully trained as a flight attendant and worked about three times a week, on call. Regulations state that aircraft with 19 seats or under do not require a qualified flight attendant, and she was considered to be a customer service representative.What Part 135 requires14 CFR 135.107: no certificate holder may operate an aircraft that has more than 19 passenger seats, unless there is a flight attendant onboard. The accident aircraft was equipped with only nine passenger seats, therefore did not require a qualified flight attendant.14 CFR 135.295: A certificate holder must test flight attendant crewmembers, initially and recurrently, on their knowledge and competence in subjects that include passenger briefings, emergency equipment and emergency exits.14 CFR 135.117: The pilot in command must ensure that passengers are briefed before each takeoff on smoking, the use of seatbelts, the location and operation of doors and exits, and the location of survival equipment and fire extinguishers. The briefing may be given by the pilot in command or another crewmember.14 CFR 135.122: No certificate holder may move an aircraft on the surface, takeoff or land when any food, beverage or tableware furnished by the certificate holder is located at any passenger seat.14 CFR 135.128: Each person on board an aircraft operated under this part shall occupy an approved seat with a safety belt properly secured during movement on the surface, takeoff and landing.What the NTSB flaggedIn its final report, the NTSB said it was concerned that some operators delegate safety-critical functions to cabin aides who have not received appropriate training, and that passengers may believe a cabin aide is a qualified flight attendant. The main points brought up were that the cabin aide did not perform seatbelt compliance checks, she failed to collect beverage items in the cabin before takeoff and was unable to open the door or evacuate the aircraft. They recommended that the FAA should require that cabin personnel on Part 135 flights receive FAA-approved training in preflight briefings and safety checks, emergency exit operation, and emergency equipment usage. All training should be documented and recorded by the operator.What flight departments and passengers need to knowPart 135 operators still are not required to carry a flight attendant on aircraft with 19 or fewer passenger seats, the same threshold in place at the time of the accident. That leaves the training of cabin staff on smaller aircraft largely to each operator, and passengers may assume, as several on N370V did, that the person serving them is a trained flight attendant. Charter customers and flight departments can ask before boarding who is in the cabin and what that person is qualified to do.