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On September 19, 2008, just before midnight, a Learjet 60 with registration N999LJ was due to take off from Columbia Metropolitan Airport in South Carolina. The aircraft was operated by Global Exec Aviation and was bound for Van Nuys Airport in California. The Learjet 60 had entered service in 2006 and carried two crew and four passengers.The passengers included musician Travis Barker, drummer for Blink-182, and DJ Adam ‘DJ AM' Goldstein, who had performed that night at the university in Columbia. With them were members of their entourage, Charles ‘Che' Still Jr., Barker's bodyguard, and Chris ‘Lil Chris' Baker, his assistant.The captain was Sarah Lemmon, and the first officer was James Bland; both had joined the company in 2008. The captain had 3,140 flight hours, including 35 on the Learjet 60 and eight hours as captain on type. The first officer had 8,200 flight hours, with 300 hours on the Learjet 60.A rejected takeoff beyond V1At 11:53, they lined up on the runway. As the aircraft accelerated, surviving passengers reported that it began shifting and swaying during the takeoff roll. Then there was a loud bang, and the aircraft started to sway violently from side to side. Air traffic controllers saw sparks coming from the aircraft. The captain believed there had been a tire failure and aborted the takeoff. The first officer then notified the controller to send an emergency response crew, as they would be departing the runway.The Learjet 60 overran the 8,601-foot runway, striking airport lighting, navigation antennas and concrete posts. It then crashed through the airport boundary fence, crossed a highway and hit an embankment before bursting into flames. Airport firefighters arrived quickly and brought the fire under control about 10 minutes later. The aircraft was completely destroyed by the post-crash fire.Both pilots, Still and Baker, died in the crash. Goldstein and Barker escaped down the wing of the aircraft. Both survivors suffered second- and third-degree burns, with Barker's recovery requiring multiple skin grafts. He suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and did not fly again until 13 years later, in 2021.Underinflated tires and inadequate maintenanceThe NTSB concluded that the accident was caused by severely underinflated tires that failed during the takeoff roll and the captain's decision to abort the takeoff after V1, which was inconsistent with training and standard operating procedures. The company's director of maintenance estimated that the tire pressures may not have been checked for about three weeks, and the NTSB cited inadequate maintenance as the reason the underinflation went unnoticed. After the accident, Bombardier Learjet issued an FAA-approved temporary flight manual change requiring tire-pressure checks within 96 hours before takeoff.Compounding the tire failures, debris damaged components in the wheel wells and hydraulic system, reducing the aircraft's braking capability. The Learjet reached a peak ground speed of about 144 knots (267 km/h). V1 for the flight was approximately 136 knots (252 km/h), above which a rejected takeoff was to be attempted only if the aircraft's ability to fly was seriously in doubt. The NTSB also noted the captain's limited Learjet 60 and pilot-in-command experience, poor CRM between the flight crew and inadequate training for flight crews in tire-failure scenarios.A thrust-reverser design flaw made matters worseInvestigators also found a design deficiency in the thrust-reverser system that increased the severity of the accident. Shortcomings in both Learjet's design and the FAA's certification process were cited as contributing factors by the NTSB.This accident highlighted both design and maintenance vulnerabilities. Debris from failed tires damaged the air/ground sensing system, causing the aircraft to transition from ground mode to air mode. That commanded the thrust reversers to stow. Because the cockpit reverse levers remained raised, the engines subsequently produced high forward thrust instead of reverse thrust during the rejected takeoff, making a bad situation much worse. The accident also highlighted the Learjet 60's susceptibility to tire-pressure loss and the risk that underinflated tires could fail at high speed during the takeoff roll.Changes after the accidentThe NTSB recommended that operators perform tire-pressure checks at a frequency that would ensure the tires remained within aircraft maintenance manual-specified inflation pressures and emphasized pressure checks rather than visual-only assessments. It also called for improvements in simulator training for Learjet 60 pilots involving tire failures close to and after V1.The NTSB also called for changes to the Learjet 60 thrust-reverser system, including modifications for existing aircraft and improved aural and visual warnings to alert crews to thrust-reverser status and reduce the risk of uncommanded forward thrust. Additionally, investigators recommended that the FAA evaluate the Hawker 1000 business jet, which used a similar thrust-reverser system, for comparable failure modes.The lesson for operatorsFor operators, the lesson is that a certified yet flawed design can turn into a critical situation when it crosses paths with relaxed maintenance procedures and incomplete training. It's impossible to train for every scenario, but complacency opens the door to situations that no one sees coming until it's too late.