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A group chartered a Gulfstream III from California to Aspen on March 29, 2001, for a birthday dinner and ski trip, but they would never reach their destination. The aircraft crashed into a hillside outside of the airport, killing all onboard. The circumstances were unusual because Aspen-Pitkin County Airport had a curfew at 18:58 and did not allow night landings, and the accident occurred at 19:02. There was a snowstorm at the time, and a passenger was seated in the cockpit. So what exactly happened? It came down to a passenger more concerned with making his dinner than arriving safely, and a crew with no structured way to say no.The aircraft, the crew, and the airportThe aircraft registration was N303GA and operated by Avjet, an on-demand charter company. The company partnered with private jet owners; when the owners did not need them, it was a win-win situation. The Gulfstream III was registered to Airbourne Charter, Inc., and reportedly linked to Hollywood producer Andrew Vajna, known for "Rambo" and "Total Recall".The flight crew members were Captain Robert Frisbie, First Officer Peter Kowalczyk, and Flight Attendant Catherine Naranjo. The flight crew had been flying on the same aircraft for five months and had flown into Aspen twice before during daylight hours.The runway elevation of Aspen-Pitkin County Airport, one of the busiest in business aviation, is more than 7,800 feet above sea level, and the airfield is at the base of a narrow valley with mountains on each side.The procedure was to descend to 10,200 feet, maintain altitude until the airport was visible, then circle and land visually. Pilots could also perform a straight-in approach as long as they could see the runway and line up with it. Just a week before the flight, an FAA inspector had questioned the safety of the published instrument approach. The FAA issued a NOTAM advising that circling minimums were not authorized at night. The flight crew were advised of this, but it was unclear how it was to be interpreted.The aircraft had been chartered by Robert New, a financier in the Los Angeles entertainment industry. He was traveling with 14 friends for a dinner party celebrating the birthday of one of his friends, Mario Aguilar. Some of Aguilar's relatives were also traveling with them, as well as two others from a Los Angeles production company. A weekend of skiing had been planned at Aspen's famous resorts.A late departure and a client who wouldn't divertAt 14:38, the crew met the aircraft in Burbank, California before flying a short ferry flight to pick up the entourage at Los Angeles International Airport. On reaching the airport, there was no sign of the passengers, which was going to be an issue as there were restrictions at Aspen, due to noise restrictions and the Gulfstream III could not land there at night. The scheduled departure time was at 15:30, after which Avjet's dispatcher called Robert New's assistant who had booked the flight, to check where the passengers were. He said that if the flight did not leave at 15:55, they could not land at Aspen.The passengers were not aware of any urgency to board their flight and were found chatting in the parking lot. As the passengers boarded, one of the pilots informed a passenger that they may have to divert to Rifle, a lower-elevation airport about 50 miles away, if they could not reach Aspen by the curfew at 18:58. Robert New overheard and asked his assistant to call Avjet and tell the pilot to "keep his comments to himself." When one of the pilots informed him directly that they may have to divert, he became very angry and asked his assistant to call Avjet again and said that the flight would not be diverted under any circumstances. He commented he'd landed in Aspen at night before and would do so again.The Gulfstream III departed from Los Angeles at 16:11, after the deadline and 41 minutes after the original departure time. The flight crew estimated their time of arrival in Aspen as 18:46 just before the curfew. The captain told Avjet that it was important to land in Aspen as "the customer spent a substantial amount of money on dinner."The approach into a closing weather windowAt 18:37, the flight crew discussed how they would approach the airport, and the captain said that he hoped they could save time by seeing the airport early and performing a visual approach. He said that they did not have much fuel, so there was only one chance to land, or they would go to Rifle. Weather conditions were far from ideal with cloud cover and snow, which were getting worse. One private jet had just had a missed approach, but a Cessna had got in, with a straight-in approach.A visual approach was now not possible. The first officer joked about a prior trip to Aspen, where a Learjet pilot had said he could see the airport when he couldn't see it. The captain did not respond. Another private jet had a missed approach, the first officer said: "That's not good." At 18:54, the flight attendant entered the cockpit and said that a passenger wanted to sit in the jumpseat. They agreed; it was thought to have been Robert New. This was another distraction.The captain told him: "The weather's gone down and they're not making it in," referring to the missed approaches. The passenger replied, "Oh really." They were cleared for an instrument approach but had not conducted the relevant briefing, and visibility was getting worse. The aircraft was cleared to land. At 18:58, one of the prior private jets reported a second missed approach. The passenger said: "Are we clear?" The captain said, "Not yet. The guy in front of us didn't make it either."The curfew was now in place, but they continued their descent towards the airport. The flight crew said that they had the runway in sight, although they were still in clouds and snow. It is thought that they lied as they did not want to be told to go around and divert by the controller or upset Robert New. They continued to guess their way to the airport, drifting to the right of the runway. The GPWS warned them they were 500 feet above the ground.The captain pushed to full power, but the aircraft was now in the valley, banking left, triggering a warning. The left wingtip struck the ground, and the jet cartwheeled in the snow, leaving debris in its trail. It slammed into the side of a ravine and came to a halt on the highway, in flames. The aircraft quickly disintegrated, and everyone onboard perished. Two passengers were found still strapped in their seats in the middle of the highway.What the NTSB foundThere was no flight data recorder, so the NTSB had to reconstruct the flight path. The CVR suggested that although they reported the runway was in sight, it was not. The captain did not speak in the final seconds. It was not clear why he made the maneuver to the left as he did, but investigators said that he either saw the runway on his left and prepared to line up with it or to avoid high ground or both. The aircraft could not climb after the bank.There was confusion as to the actions of the flight crew. Why did they not divert, like the other private jets? They were also past the curfew and should have abandoned the approach. Interviews were held with Avjet staff and Robert New's assistant, and it was found that his insistence on making it to the dinner party was above everything else, and his comments to the flight crew and the captain's call to Avjet confirmed this.The flight crew knew that Robert New had paid a large amount to charter the jet as well as for the dinner and that if they couldn't make Aspen, he would not fly with Avjet again, and he was clearly angry and threatening in his behavior, and came into the cockpit during the approach. The flight crew very likely felt the pressure to land no matter what because of the client and ‘get-there-itis.'The flight crew did not believe they were breaking a safety regulation and thought the planned straight-in landing would only be a noise violation. The local controller could have potentially stopped them but was unaware of the new NOTAM. The flight crew were focused on looking for the runway instead of monitoring their descent rate and altitude; callouts were not present, and they did not brief for the approach. It is thought that they expected to see the runway and level off. They also did not discuss a potential go-around, although there was a good chance that it would happen.The NTSB looked into the flight crew's training and found that the first officer had failed three check rides due to poor ground reference maneuvers on approach and landing. The flight crew had also not received crew resource management training (CRM). Avjet operated under Part 135, so did not require it as commercial airlines did. It is also thought that they did not have the risk assessment skills covered in CRM to make better decisions in a difficult situation.The NOTAM was changed with clearer wording, and the curfew was changed due to the definition of ‘nightfall' at the airport. Avjet informed its pilots that at mountain airports like Aspen, they must be on the ground before sunset, and all passengers were informed of the rule. If they felt pressure from clients and ‘get-there-itis,' they should inform the chief pilot. Passengers were also banned from using a jumpseat.While the rules have changed, some of the dynamics that killed the passengers and crew have not: each charter flight leaves with a paying client in the back and a reason to arrive on time. At the time, Avjet was not required to train its pilots in crew resource management (CRM), which is the discipline that teaches a cockpit to divide pressure, question a plan, and say no out loud. That gap is now closed and the Aspen crash helped pave the regulatory way. Since 2013 the FAA has required CRM training for every Part 135 operator.