Fatal flight training accident rate drops 50 percent over 20 years

Every pilot's journey begins with a lesson. Flight training is the start of any career or lifelong hobby and pilots can continue learning as long as they are flying. Aviation requires the routine examination of skills and knowledge, whether an individual has been flying for a few months or a few decades. The AOPA Air Safety Institute and Liberty University published a comprehensive study of deadly flight training accidents and the results show a nearly 50 percent reduction over the last nearly 20 years. Flight training accounts for nearly 20 percent of flight activity. The current study has built on the comprehensive 16-year study published in 2019 with an updated dataset spanning 20 years. The report delves into the risks and innovations in flight training over the last two decades and includes accident prevention and mitigation recommendations to reduce flight training accidents. The combined efforts in the flight training community have shown a close to 50 percent reduction over the 20 years analyzed. From 2000-2019 there were 287 fatal flight training accidents. This includes dual and solo operations categorized by the NTSB as instructional in fixed-wing, piston singles and light twins with reciprocating engines under 500 horsepower per engine. The data covers U.S. aviation data and excludes foreign accidents and crashes in amateur built planes, light-sport, twin-engine with more than six seats and single-engine with more than 500 horsepower. The report indicates that the flight training accident rate continues to improve. From 2000 to 2004, the fatal accident rate averaged 0.49 per hundred thousand hours. From 2005 to 2009, the rate dropped to 0.41 percent. Entering the second decade, from 2010 to 2014, the rate averaged 0.39 and ended the 2015 to 2019 period at 0.26. Flight activity was trending downward from 2000 to 2014 but recent activity numbers show a recovery around 2018, ending with 5.7 million hours per year. The report compares deadly crashes from the first decade, in the 2000s, to the second, in the 2010s. The FAA estimates that over 37 million instructional flight hours were flown in the 2000s and just under 38 million were flown during the 2010s. Loss of control in flight is the leading cause of deadly instructional crashes, followed by midair collisions and controlled flight into terrain. Accident Analysis LOC-I LOC-I is the number one risk while flight training and accounts for 155 deadly crashes. Of these crashes, 89 occurred in the 2000s and 66 in the 2010s. The majority of these loss of control events were stall or spin accidents, or Vmc rolls (loss of control in a twin-engine plane with asymmetric power at low speeds). Other incidents include loss of control for other reasons like spatial disorientation and structural limitation exceedance. Most fatal loss of control crashes occur during the takeoff/climb/go-around phase of flight, accounting for 48 of the 155 accidents or 31 percent. This equates to an average of 2.4 deadly instructional training accidents each year. There is growing concern over the number of stall or spin accidents during the high-power, high-AOA phase of flight after an increase from 23 accidents in the 2000s to 25 during the 2010s. There is a common failure to properly manage the angle of attack during takeoff, climb out or go-around events. Maneuvering is the second largest phase within loss of control and accounted for 45 deadly occurrences. There was a decrease in maneuvering fatalities from the 2000s to the 2010s and was the biggest indicator of improvement within the LOC-I accident rate. This change could support the FAA's choice to improve stall horn awareness by changing the slow flight maneuver in the airman certification standards. Emergency procedures made up the third phase and included both simulated emergencies and real emergencies. This category increased from 10 deadly crashes in the 2000s to 16 in the 2010s. Midair Collisions Midairs were the second leading cause of deadly instructional crashes from 2000 to 2019 with the report showing 27 training flights involved in 23 midair collisions. Seventy percent, or 19 flights, occurred outside of the airport environment, compared to traditional GA where 51 percent will occur beyond the airport environment. Five of these occurred in Class D airspace and three were at nontowered airports. Maneuvering and en route phases of flight le to midair collision locations with 11 and nine, respectively, approach was third with four, followed by climb with two and takeoff with one. The report also noted that most of the training collisions outside of the airport environment occurred in VFR or IFR cruising altitudes. The midair collision category saw the most dramatic changes from the first to second decade studied. These accounted for 21 deadly accidents from 2000 to 2009 but only six from 2010 to 2019. This drastic drop could be attributed to newer technology like TIS and ADS-B. The analysis also notes that the FAA's emphasis on operating with lights on below 10,000 feet agl and advancements in the visibility of LED recognition lights may have been factors. Other risk-reductions include deconflicting practice areas, the use of ATC flight following service and an emphasis on the fundamental principles of see and avoid. Controlled flight into terrain CFIT is the third leasing cause in the study, showing a slight decrease from 11 in the 2000s to eight in the 2010s. Reduced visibility plays a major role in many CFIT crashes, with 13 of the 19 accidents taking place at night and/or IMC conditions. CFIT accidents largely occur during maneuvering with nine, followed by en route and approach both with four. Two CFIT accidents took place during missed approaches, showcasing the need to properly execute these types of approaches. The analysis said it is important to note that the is some overlap between CFIT and Unintended Flight in IMC. There were several crashes reported that met the criteria for both categories. Of the combined CFIT and UIMC crashes, five involved improper instrument procedures with an instructor on board, four involved dual flights encountering IMC unexpectedly and four involved solo students encountering IMC unexpectedly. The most common subcategories of the CFIT accidents in visual conditions were loss of terrain awareness at night with four occurrences, practicing simulated engine outs during the day with three, and possible spatial disorientation with two accidents. Fuel related Fuel-related accidents were the fourth leading cause, but there has been a slow reduction as flight schools are integrating more technically advanced aircraft into their fleets. The low-fuel crew alerting system was shown to be effective in reducing cases of fuel exhaustion and starvation. The analysis found that four examples of fuel starvation in the 2000s all involved a failure to switch tanks, but three examples in the 2010s involved the fuel selector being off or in an intermediate position. System component failure-powerplant SCF-PP was the fifth leading cause of fatal flight training crashes, with 14 events over the last 20 years. Seven of these were attributed to the improper maintenance but did not indicate any consistent error among the events. Two engines failed after the failure to clean the oil screen, one failed after a fuel filter was installed backwards, one due to a carburetor's missing cotter pin, one due to improper thru-bolt tension, one due to metal shavings left after tapping a fuel manifold, and one due to poor magento installation. There were two engines that failed suddenly, one due to exhaust valve failure and one due to a sheared or corroded mixture cable. The report shows that the rate of deadly engine failure events has decreased in the last 20 years. Intentionally low altitude maneuvering LALT is the sixth largest category and in the last 20 years, four crews have crashed during mountain flying lessons, three during attempted canyon escapes, two during aerial application training, two hit powerlines and two crashed after aggressive maneuvering. The report concludes there is a decrease in the number of deadly instructional crashes with an accident rate average decrease from 0.49 in the first five years of the study to 0.26 in the last five years. Instructional aviation has a lower accident rate than GA and safety has improved at a quicker pace. There have been numerous technological updates that may have contributed to the decline, including angle of attack indicators, flight envelope protection, traffic displays, moving map displays and terrain overlays. Many flight training providers are operating newer fleets with more modern avionics and crash restraints like shoulder harnesses and airbags. During the study period the FAA also introduced new policy for the installation of many of these devices and technologies at a lower price point to allow for greater fleet adoption.Graph from the Fatal Flight Training Report Training has changed, including substantial changes in stall recovery training at the airline transport level, which took effect in 2012 and emphasize the importance of reducing the AOA as the first step in stall recovery. While this change was most notably at the ATP level, the attention to proper stall recovery has seen benefits across the whole industry. Many Part 141 schools, clubs and training providers are emphasizing standardization in the training environment. The FAA has also updated airman certification standards to require applicants to demonstrate risk management and aeronautical decision-making skills. Safety has improved substantially in the last two decades but there is always room for improvement. Owners and operators are encouraged to look into new technology and innovations, like angle of attack indicators. While there has been a significant decrease in flight training crashes over the last 20 years, the goal is always zero fatalities. By studying crashes and related data, we can learn how to improve safety in the future and reduce the number of crashes for the next 20 years.